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THE ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION WITHIN THE PROGRAM 




PEO IWS was stood-up in October of 2002. Since then, the organization has had 
to change the way it delivered warfare systems to the Fleet.  This re-organization could 
be compared to a merger or major transition in the private sector. The organization is still 
in a state of change. 
The purpose of this MBA project is to describe PEO IWS and analyze its 
implementation of organizational change. The issues that stem from how the change was 
approached are identified and compared to leading organizational change theories. 
Conceivably, PEO IWS must coordinate and communicate within themselves to 
field these warfare systems.  The term for this is Horizontal Integration and it can be 
defined as integrating multiple warfare systems within and across platforms to achieve 
maximum warfighting capability through enterprise program management, systems 
engineering, performance measurement, lifecycle management, and processes as related 
to acquisition, contracts, financial requirements allocation, systems development and 
integration, test, and certification.1  
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The change initiated by Secretary Young in October 2002 presented challenges to 
PEO IWS and its stakeholders. This research presents three possible change models that 
lend insight into how PEO IWS could have managed the organizational change more 
efficiently. Portions of each of the three change models are identified in the PEO IWS 
change process. Had the leadership incorporated more of the change theories’ ideas, it is 
possible that some of the challenges with horizontal integration might have been 
mitigated. Horizontal integration in PEO IWS suffers because there are little or no 
processes in place to coordinate the interactions of each entity that contributes to fielding 
a warfare system onto a platform.  
To help adjudicate issues that would standardize horizontal integration and the 
integrated warfare system engineering processes across the PEO IWS organization, PEO 
IWS has recently stood-up an executive level panel called the Horizontal Integration 
Board (HIB).  The purpose of the HIB is to guide and oversee the integration of warfare 
systems across PEO IWS. The HIB’s role is to coordinate the integration of multiple 
warfare systems within and across ship classes to achieve maximum war fighting 
capability while minimizing total ownership cost.2 The HIB is a step in unifying PEO 
IWS and has the potential to make a major command and Enterprise-wide contribution. 
The intent of the HIB is to neck down baselines within individual PARMs and 
concentrate on cross functional disciplines when necking down system baselines.  
There are many processes that are being updated to accommodate the 
organizational change occurring in PEO IWS. How effective the standing up of PEO IWS 
will not be surely realized for a few years. But for those that were involved in standing up 
PEO IWS it is likely to be remembered as the right thing to do and much harder than 
anticipated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) is 
responsible for the design, acquisition, and life cycle support of all surface ship combat 
systems. The goal of PEO IWS is to reduce the number of warfare system configurations 
and to minimize acquisition and life-cycle support costs while promoting commonality of 
warfare system components across Air Craft Carriers, Amphibious Ships, Command 
Ships, Surface Combatants, and Submarines.3  
PEO IWS was stood-up in November of 2002. Since then, the organization has 
had to change to adapt to a new way of delivering warfare systems to the Fleet.  This re-
organization could be compared to a merger or major transition in the private sector. The 
organization is still in a state of flux.  
Conceivably, PEO IWS must coordinate and communicate within itself to field 
these warfare systems.  The term for this is Horizontal Integration and it can be defined 
as integrating multiple warfare systems within and across platforms to achieve maximum 
warfighting capability through enterprise program management, systems engineering, 
performance measurement, lifecycle management, and processes as related to acquisition, 
contracts, financial requirements allocation, systems development and integration, test, 
and certification.4   
 
B. OBJECTIVE AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
The purpose of this MBA project is to describe PEO IWS and analyze its 
implementation of Horizontal Integration. The issues that stem from how the change was 
approached are identified and compared to leading organizational change theories. 
 
 
                                                 
3 PEO IWS Command Overview brief V2, September 6, 2005. 
4 PEO IWS Horizontal Integration Board brief, March 17, 2006. 
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C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 This project is limited to PEO IWS its partners and key stakeholders. Many 
factors can contribute to the successes and/or failures of integration outside the influence 
of PEO IWS. However, the effort of this project concentrates exclusively on the 
occurrences within PEO IWS, its partners and key stakeholders.  
 The responsibility for “integrating” the warfare systems that PEO IWS produces 
resides within PEO IWS 1.0 (Integrated Combat Systems). Those who are responsible for 
the integration are called Warfare Systems Engineers (WSE) and are divided into 
platform responsibility: DDG/CG Warfare Systems (1A1A), Future Warfare Systems 
(1A3), CVN Warfare Systems (1A4), Amphibious/Coast Guard Warfare Systems (1A5), 
and LCS Warfare Systems (1A6).  
 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
Interviews and written communication with members of PEO IWS 1.0 were used 
to gather information on how the process of Horizontal Integration occurs within PEO 
IWS.  Several PowerPoint briefs were used as resources and background information. 
Email was used to stay informed and to get clarification on the most current issues 
occurring within PEO IWS. Some are referenced in this project others were used as 
background information and for further understanding. Applicable change theories were 
used to analyze how PEO IWS implemented its change. Additionally, the author of this 
report was a member of the organization from July 2003 through December 2005. 
 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Following this introduction, Chapter II reviews the background of PEO IWS. 
Chapter III examines applicable research in the field of organizational change. An 
analysis of Horizontal Integration within PEO IWS is offered in Chapter IV. Chapter V 
presents the summary. 
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II. PEO IWS BACKGROUND 
PEO IWS has three major responsibilities. First, it is responsible for combat and 
ship self-defense system functionality and the acquisition and life cycle support of 
integrated warfare systems for the Navy. Second, PEO IWS is responsible for life cycle 
sustainment of the warfare systems including planning, programming, and budgeting for 
system upgrades, modifications and installations. Third, PEO IWS is responsible for 
ensuring that the products delivered meet the requirements at an affordable cost. 
 
A. THE ORIGIN OF PEO IWS 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition 
(ASN RD&A), The Honorable John J. Young, Jr. reorganized the structure and function 
of the Navy’s office for research, development and acquisition in a naval message dated 
11 October 2002. In that message, the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare 
Systems (PEO IWS) was created to transition the Navy’s warfare system acquisition from 
a platform-centered focus to an integrated, cross-Navy approach. Hi-lights of the message 
are below: 
…The intent of these changes is to ensure that the Acquisition Community 
is aligned to address the challenges of the Navy and Marine Corps of the 
21st Century. We must change from an approach that is optimized by 
program and platform to one that can solve the challenges of integrated 
systems that cross many platforms and functions. We must also take a 
stronger business focus across multiple platforms and systems to 
maximize the efficiency and buying power of the multi-billion dollar 
enterprise that is DON Acquisition. 
…We will create a new PEO for Integrated Warfare Systems in order to 
provide the required discipline and coordination of the architecture and 
overarching interface principles to which our systems will be developed. 
This PEO will be responsible for all surface ship and submarine combat 
systems, missiles (except Trident and Tomahawk), radars, launchers 
(except Trident), EW, and gun systems. 
…This realignment changes our focus from the current platform centered 
approach to a more integrated approach across all combat systems. As the 
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Navy moves to open systems architecture and highly integrated systems of 
systems, it is critical that those efforts have a strong, consistent focus. 
This message disestablished PEO Theater Surface Combatants and PEO 
Expeditionary Warfare among other organizations. The responsibility for all combat 
system programs were realigned to PEO IWS. It also established PEO C4I to ensure all 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence systems, including 
those related to combat or platform systems, were developed as part of a coherent 
architecture. Furthermore, it established PEO Ships bringing commonality across ship 
classes, established PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) whose responsibilities 
include; Mine Warfare, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Special Warfare, 
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), Potential Assault Vehicles, Developing 
and fielding all subsurface and surface unmanned vehicles, and integrating all Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles. 
 
B. ORGANIZATION OF PEO IWS 
PEO IWS is charged to oversee efforts to design, build, and buy warfare systems 
that are integrated, interoperable, and ride on an open systems computing architecture. 
This includes all ship and submarine warfare systems designed for “the Navy Enterprise.” 
Taking an enterprise approach is intended to maximize the allocation of scarce resources. 
The re-organization was designed to consolidate management functions thereby reducing 
overhead and allowing for adoption of consistent management systems and merging 
support functions.5  
Serving as the Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems is a 
Navy Rear Admiral with a civilian Senior Executive Service member as his Executive 
Director.  In order to align itself to ASN RD&A’s message, PEO IWS organized itself 
into seven Major Program Managers (MPM): 
• PEO IWS 1.0 manages the Navy’s Integrated Combat Systems. Its mission 
is to develop, manage, integrate, test and certify all Surface Domain 
                                                 
5 Warfare Systems Acquisitions Strategy brief, August 25, 2005. 
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Combat Systems to meet current new construction and ship class 
modernization schedules.  
• PEO IWS 2.0 manages the Navy’s surface ship above water sensors – 
radars and electronic warfare systems.  
• PEO IWS 3.0 manages the surface navy’s weapons and launchers (except 
Tomahawk).  
• PEO IWS 4.0 is the lead directorate for coordination of international 
activities within PEO IWS.  
• PEO IWS 5.0 is the lead for the navy’s surface ship undersea systems. 
• PEO IWS 6.0 manages the surface navy’s command and control as well as 
displays and processors.  
• PEO IWS 7.0 is responsible for the Enterprise Navy’s management of 
Open Architecture. 
Each Major Program Manager is a US Navy Captain (0-6) or member of the 
Civilian Senior Executive Service (SES) and has an organization that oversees budgets 
ranging from $287 million to $1.3 billion dollars of total obligational authority (TOA). In 
PEO IWS there are a total of 104 programs including three ACAT ID programs, three 
ACAT 1C programs, seven ACAT II programs, twelve ACAT III and IV programs.6 
Figure 3 in the appendix shows the description and decision authority for ACAT I – III 
programs. 
 
C. WHY CREATE PEO IWS?  
Before PEO IWS was created, the Navy’s surface ship acquisition community 
was centered on acquiring systems based on a particular platform. The Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (ASN RD&A) argued 
that this “platform-centric view” was not the most efficient way to acquire the Navy’s 
                                                 
6 PEO IWS Command Overview brief Version 2, September 6, 2005. 
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surface ship warfare systems.  His naval message dated 11 October, 2002 changed the 
acquisition process to be more “systems-centric” by re-organizing the PEOs and 
establishing PEO IWS. 7 
In the past, equipment was developed specifically for a ship platform. This 
practice made sense because that individual ship had the best equipment at that time. 
However, the downside of this practice is that each ship was created differently. 
Additionally, there were several variants of each system on a ship class. Each variant 
needed to be developed, fielded and supported for its lifetime in the fleet. The intent of 
standing up PEO IWS was to change the management of the combat systems acquisition 
process and eliminate the rising lifecycle costs of supporting multiple systems. By 





                                                 
7 ASN RD&A Naval Message Date Time Group 112123Z OCT 02. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three approaches to the management of change in organizations were used to 
compare with the change process in PEO IWS; Quy Nguyen Huy’s change interventions, 
John Kotter’s eight-stage process and a GAO study on mergers and transitions in public 
entities. 
 
A. TIME AND FOUR IDEAL TYPES OF CHANGE INTERVENTION 
Huy establishes four types of planned change approaches that he labels: 
commanding (to change formal structures), engineering (to change work processes), 
teaching (to change beliefs), and socializing (to change social relationships).  
1. Commanding 
In the commanding approach, prescient and comprehensive planning before 
radical change is assumed to be possible. Leadership of change belongs to one small 
group of people, typically located at the top of the formal hierarchy – the top team aided 
by external consultants. The faster the lower levels of the organization can align 
themselves with the top’s directives, the faster the desired economic performance is 
assumed to be realized. Thus the lower levels of the organization are assumed to be very 
tightly coupled, like a mechanical clock. The pacing of the commanding type tends to be 
abrupt and rapid to prevent resistance to change form gathering momentum inside the 
organization.  At best, this intervention can be used to order a change in tangible entities, 
such as people or formal structures and systems. It is unlikely that a lasting qualitative 
change in basic beliefs or values can be achieved. Agents applying the commanding 
intervention should hold a quantitative time perspective that favors the near term. Huy 
argues that the commanding type is relatively more effective at making changes in formal 
structures than the teaching, engineering, and socializing types. He then goes on to state 
that change in formal structures can be, and usually should be, preceded or combined 
with other types that make the commanding approach more acceptable to change 
recipients . 
 10
2. Engineering  
In the engineering intervention, changing the work processes is the focus.  It 
refers to change agents’ actions of analyzing, understanding, and then redesigning work 
processes to improve the speed and quality of production. It is focused on improving the 
completion of work assigned. Departmentalized, fragmented tasks become 
multidimensional, integrated and adapted to local requirements. This takes time. It is 
likely to be used when the change agents’ purpose is to produce improvement in the 
firm’s performance through process change. The time perspective is quantitative and 
favors the medium term.8 
3. Teaching 
The teaching intervention refers to an analytical and guided learning approach in 
which change targets participate in their own re-education through the active involvement 
of change agents. Once the target of change understands the change process and reason, 
the individual may be able to learn freely. This enhances the organizations ability to 
innovate and adapt to uncertain environments. Huy argues, the teaching intervention 
approach is likely to be effective at changing beliefs. Changing beliefs is a personal 
decision and accomplished based on ones personal qualitative time schedule. The time 
perspective that favors such change is the moderately long term.9  
Inner qualitative time differs from quantitative time discussed in the commanding 
and engineering approach in that it is subjective. Accommodating inner time requires 
change agents to be patient and avoid generating too much personal distress by ‘rushing’ 
events. This mode entails a moderately long time period involving a gradual and 
voluntary process that can rarely be imposed by pure power.10  
 
                                                 
8 Q.N. Huy, (2001), p 607. Time, temporal capability, and planned change. Academy of Management 
Review. Vol 26, No. 4. 601-623. 
9 Q.N. Huy, (2001), p 608. Time, temporal capability, and planned change. Academy of Management 
Review. Vol 26, No. 4. 601-623. 
10 R.H Chenhall & K.J Euske. (2006). The Role of Management Control Systems in Planned 




The socializing intervention refers to change agents’ actions to enhance the 
quality of the social relationships among organizational members to realize 
organizational tasks. Socialization involves individual emotions as well as concerns about 
power and politics. It is assumed that change in behavioral interactions among 
individuals will lead to change in beliefs and organizational culture. This contrasts with 
teaching interventions, in which changes in beliefs will lead to changes in behavior. 
Change agents using the socializing approach are often self-motivated employees who 
are distributed throughout all levels of the organization. They have bought the necessity 
for change and seek to develop synergy among various groups. Change thus occurs 
through personalized, open and imaginative conversations. In Huy terms, the socializing 
intervention approach is likely to be effective at changing social relationships and 
behaviors. Change occurs at the basis of qualitative social time. This time perspective 
favors the long term.11  
Change is difficult, therefore it is likely to require more than one intervention 
approach be applied. None of the four types is likely, by itself, to lead to large scale 
change throughout an organization. 
 
B. KOTTER’S EIGHT-STAGES OF SUCCESSFUL LARGE SCALE 
CHANGE 
According to John Kotter’s research on large scale change in organizations, there 
is an eight stage process that, if followed, will facilitate the transition the organizational 
change. In Leading Change, Kotter examines how the process of large-scale 
organizational change must work if it is to have both short-term and long-term 
sustainability.  
Kotter’s eight stages of successful large-scale change are: establish a sense of 
urgency, create the guiding coalition, develop a vision and strategy, communicate the 
                                                 
11 Q.N. Huy, (2001), p 609. Time, temporal capability, and planned change. Academy of Management 
Review. Vol 26, No. 4. 601-623. 
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change vision, empower broad based action, generate short-term wins, consolidate gains 
and produce more change, and anchor new approaches in the culture.  
The eight stages can be applied to the change in PEO IWS to attempt to see if the effects 
of the change influenced Horizontal Integration.  
1. Establish a Sense of Urgency  
The first step for successful large scale change is to increase the urgency among 
relevant people for the need to change. A sense of urgency gets people motivated to make 
a move and not be complacent.  
2. Create the Guiding Coalition 
The second of the eight steps is to gather a team with the credibility, skills, 
connections, reputations, and formal authority required to provide change leadership. Due 
to the difficulty of accomplishing major change, a powerful force is required to sustain 
the process. It is almost impossible for one person to shoulder the load and carry an 
organization to change. Kotter suggests, the team members be representatives of the 
organization in title and duties. 
3. Develop a Vision and Strategy  
The next step is for the change team to create a vision and a set of strategies. This 
vision must be sensible in the atmosphere of the organization, have buy-in with the 
guiding coalition, and move the organization in the desired direction. Kotter states;12 
Vision refers to a picture of the future with some implicit or explicit 
commentary on why people should strive to create that future. In a change 
process, a good vision serves three important purposes. First, it simplifies 
hundreds or thousands of more detailed decisions, second, it motivates 
people to take action in the right direction, and third, it helps coordinate 
the actions of different people in a remarkably fast and efficient way.  
                                                 
12 J. P. Kotter (1996). P 68. Leading Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
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4. Communicate the Change Vision  
The fourth step is that the vision needs to be communicated via the guiding 
change team in a way that is easily understandable and creates gut-level commitment 
throughout the organization. In this step, actions speak louder than words and repetition 
is required for the vision to sink in. In order to unleash the power of the vision, most of 
those involved in the organization need to have a common understanding of its goals and 
direction.13 Failures in the first three phases of a transformation effort often contribute to 
problems here.  
There are multiple lines of thinking about the failure to communicate the vision. 
One is that the employees are unable to understand it, either because the vision is too 
complicated and not phrased well. Another reason is that there is a general human 
resistance to change, and, hence, to acceptance of information about change. This also 
lends some credence to the difficulties inherent to the process. In order to demand focus, 
the vision must be re-stated over and over. 
5. Empower Broad-Based Action & Eliminate Barriers 
The purpose of this stage is to empower a broad base of people to take action by 
removing as many barriers to the implementation of the change vision as possible. After 
communicating the vision, obstacles that interfere with acting on the vision must be 
removed. Some likely candidates are structures, skills, systems, and supervisors. Once 
these barriers are removed, people can begin to proceed toward achieving the vision. 
6. Generate Short Term Wins 
To provide credibility, resources, and momentum, short-term wins are critical. 
These short-term wins drive the cynics and skeptics away and allow for the change to 
take hold. Major change takes time, accordingly to keep the momentum of the 
transformation, progress needs to be shown so that the non-believers and those not 
committed to the change see the merit in the new way.  
 
                                                 
13 J. P. Kotter (1996). P 85. Leading Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
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7. Consolidate Gains and Produce More Change  
Once the short-term wins start to accumulate, momentum builds and change 
continues to occur. It is important to keep this momentum and not quit the change process 
too soon or the whole organization will get bogged down and end up settling for less than 
the goal. 
Few things move easy when changing organizations. Nearly every element is 
connected to many other elements.14 Changing highly interdependent settings is 
extremely difficult because you have to change nearly everything. Because of the 
interconnections, you can rarely move just one element by itself.  You have to move 
dozens or hundreds or thousands of elements, which is difficult, time consuming and can 
rarely if ever be accomplished by just a few people.15 This is the step where the guiding 
coalition tackles additional, bigger change projects.  
8. Anchor New Approaches in the Culture  
The final step is for the change leaders to nurture the new culture. This new 
culture is developed through the consistency of successful action over a sufficient time 
period. In this phase, the employees’ emotions are very important. New employee 
orientation and appropriate promotions will shape the culture of the organization into the 
future.  
Culture is not something that you manipulate easily. Culture changes only after 
you have successfully altered people’s actions. It changes after the new behavior 
produces a group benefit and after people see the connection between the new action and 
the performance improvement.16 
 
C. GAO STUDY ON MERGERS AND TRANSITION STEPS 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that there are steps 
that should be followed to have a successful transformation in the public workplace. In 
                                                 
14 J. P. Kotter (1996). P 135. Leading Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
15 J. P. Kotter (1996). P 136. Leading Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
16 J. P. Kotter (1996). P 156. Leading Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
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the 2003 GAO document (GAO-03-669), “Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementing 
Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations,” the GAO defined nine key 
practices that are central to successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations in the 
public and private sector. The report was done to help federal agencies implement 
successful transformations of their cultures. These steps are similar to John Kotter’s 
steps. The nine key practices are: 
1. Ensure Top Leadership Drives the Transformation 
Leadership must set the direction, pace, tone and provide a clear, consistent 
rationale that brings everyone together behind a single mission. Leadership that is 
personally involved in the transformation gives the change process stability. The leaders 
provide an identifiable source for employees to rally upon during tumultuous times. The 
report comments that successful major change can often take 5-7 years and frequent 
leadership turnover make it difficult to obtain the sustained and inspired attention to 
make the needed changes. 
Leadership should move quickly to show commitment to the change and to 
deliver early successes. Top leadership must provide a clear and consistent rationale to 
help employees and customers and stakeholders understand the expected outcomes of the 
transformation. This rationale must stimulate the customer’s and stakeholder’s 
cooperation with, and ownership of, the outcomes - helping to build morale and 
commitment to the new vision.  
2. Establish a Coherent Mission and Integrated Strategic Goals to Guide 
the Transformation 
The mission and goals become the focus of the transformation, define the culture 
and serve as the vehicle for employees to unite and rally around. They must be clearly 
stated to all stakeholders – including employees. These goals and mission must be 
constantly re-enforced to give employees a sense of what the organization intends to 
accomplish.  
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3. Focus on a Key Set of Principles and Priorities at the Outset of the 
Transformation 
A clear set of principles and priorities serves as a framework to help the 
organization create a new culture and drive employee behaviors. Principles can serve as 
an anchor that remains valid and enduring while an organizations personnel, programs, 
and processes may change. Core values should be embedded in every aspect of the 
organization to reinforce the new culture. They represent the institutional beliefs and 
boundaries that are essential to building a new culture for the organization.  
4. Set Implementation Goals and a Timeline to Build Momentum and 
Show Progress from Day One 
Goals and a timeline are essential because the transformation could take years to 
complete and must be carefully managed. By demonstrating progress towards established 
transformation goals, the organization builds momentum and demonstrates that real 
progress is being made. Public sector transformations can be harder because they must 
deal with transparent issues that are not as common in the private sector. People and 
cultural issues must be monitored throughout the change process.  
The authors of the GAO study claim that the demand for transparency and 
accountability is a fact that needs to be accepted in any public sector transformation. 
Many stakeholders and interested parties are concerned with the results to be achieved, 
and the processes are to be used to achieve those results.  By demonstrating progress 
towards these goals, the organization builds momentum and keeps employees excited 
about the opportunities change brings and thereby helps to ensure the transformation’s 
successful completion. 
Change of culture is the basis of a successful transformation. Therefore, it must be 
addressed in the beginning and throughout the change process. Culture encompasses the 
values and behaviors that characterize the work environment. The new organization must 
hire and attract key talent who demonstrate the competencies that make the 
transformation succeed and achieve its goals. Part of cultivating the culture is to make 
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employees aware that sharing expertise and experience is important to the future of 
success of the organization and is valued in the new organization.  
5. Dedicate an Implementation Team to Manage the Transformation 
Process 
A strong and stable team is important to ensure that the transformation receives 
the needed attention to be sustained and successful. The implementation team is 
important to ensuring that various change initiatives are sequenced and implemented in a 
coherent and integrated way.  The team must have the necessary authority and resources 
to set priorities, make timely decisions, and move quickly to implement top leadership’s 
decisions regarding the transformation. The composition of the team is important because 
of how it communicates the intent of the new organization. The report recommends a 
“cadre of champions” make up the implementation team. This will help ensure that 
changes are thoroughly implemented and sustained over time. The qualification of the 
team members also communicates leadership’s commitment to the transition. They 
should be selected for their ability to drive results in a fast-paced and changing 
environment and should comprehensively understand the ultimate goal of creating a more 
successful organization. 
6. Use the Performance Management System to Define Responsibility 
and Assure Accountability for Change 
The performance management system can help manage and direct the 
transformation process if it shows how a team, unit and individual’s performance can 
contribute to overall organizational results. Leaders who demonstrate change 
management, cultural sensitivity, teamwork, collaboration, and information sharing 
should be rewarded for their success in contributing to the achievement of the 
transformation process.  Leading organizations have validated performance management 
systems that help contribute to the organization’s overall successful implantation of the 
change. 
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7. Establish a Communication Strategy to Create Shared Expectations 
and Report Related Progress 
The strategy must reach out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and 
engage them in a two-way exchange.  A successful communication strategy can build 
trust at all levels among employees and other stakeholders. Frequent and timely 
communication cultivates a strong relationship with management and helps gain 
employee ownership for the transformation. Rather than obtaining information outside of 
the organization, employees receiving information first see it as a courtesy.  This gives 
them an opportunity to ask questions or voice concerns to leadership. Successful 
communication will likely require twice the time and effort first planned. The message 
must also be consistent to alleviate uncertainties generated during unsettling times. Two-
way communication is central to forming the effective internal and external partnerships 
that are vital to the success of the transformation. Feedback allows employees to feel that 
their experiences are acknowledged and important to management. Customers and 
stakeholders should also be a top priority. They are just as essential to forming 
partnerships needed to develop and implement the organization’s strategies. Two-way 
communication gives customers and stakeholders a greater understanding of how the 
transformation will affect them. Inaccurate information needs to be dispelled as quickly 
as possible. 
8. Involve Employees to Obtain Their Ideas and Gain Their Ownership 
for the Transformation 
Employee involvement strengthens the process and allows them to share their 
experiences and shape policies. It helps create the opportunity to establish new networks 
and break down existing organizational silos, increase employees’ understanding and 
acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership for new policies 
and procedures.  
There tends to be a small group of employees in every organization that resist any 
meaningful change and will not and cannot buy into the transformation no matter how 
compelling the case for change may be.  This group may try to “wait out” the 
transformation and think that it will pass without taking hold. Eventually, these 
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employees must either accept the changes or be helped to move elsewhere within or 
outside the organization.  
The GAO report suggests creating opportunities for employees to interact so that 
they can learn more about each other. This helps to establish new networks and to break 
down organizational silos. Teams that have members from a cross-section of the 
organization assist in integrating different perspectives, flattening organizational structure 
and streamlining operations. Employees should be involved in planning and sharing 
performance information. This allows the employee to see where the organization is 
headed and its progress toward the change goal. Feedback should be incorporated into the 
new policies and procedures. This allows for management and employees to work 
collaboratively to gain ownership in the change.  
9. Build a World-Class Organization 
Building on a vision of improved performance, the organization adopts the most 
efficient, effective, and economical personnel, system, and process changes. The 
organization continually seeks to implement best practices. 
Leaders should determine the essential systems and process that will need to be 
consistent across the organization and those that can differ across the organization. This 
sends a powerful message about the seriousness of the effort to create a coherent 
organization and the speed at which that effort will take place. These processes and 
procedures should be selected from existing “best practices.” Using these systems and 
procedures are widely recognized for contributing to performance improvements in many 
areas. 
The GAO report identified implementation steps that would help federal agencies 
implement successful transformations. It outlines key practices to assist mergers and 
organizational transformations. It can be modified to fit the circumstances and conditions 
that are relevant to any agency. Collectively, these key practices and implementation 
steps can help agencies transform their cultures so that the federal government has the 
capacity to deliver its promises, meet current and emerging needs, maximize its 
performance, and ensure accountability. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Each of the approaches to organizational change described above give a model for 
an organization to follow to induce successful organizational change. Huy’s four types of 
planned change interventions deal with organizational structures, processes, beliefs, and 
social relationships. Kotter’s change stages give a straight-forward, step-by-step process 
for organizations to manage change, and the GAO report outlines key practices to assist 
in organizational transformations.  
The approaches to organizational change differ in emphasis from the author’s 
perspective. One large difference between Kotter’s change stages and the GAO report’s 
steps is that the GAO report focuses more on the people aspect of the organization. A 
good example of this is that the GAO devotes a step specifically to “involving employees 
to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation.” Kotter’s steps are 
more focused toward the change team being successful at communicating the vision to 
the people. The GAO report heavily relies on the employees in the organization to carry 
the transformation where Kotter’s stages rely on the success of the Change Team.  Huy’s 
change approaches look at change differently than Kotter and the writers of the GAO 
report.  He does not present a step process however, he emphasizes that time is a 
significant influence to decision makers choices related to transformation and 
organizational change. He states that large scale change involves many organizational 
elements that require a combination of two or more of his change intervention 
approaches.   
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IV. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION IN PEO IWS 
This chapter compares the information gathered to the literature introduced in the 
previous chapter. Comments are based upon the authors experience as a participant 
observer of the change and on the data gathered from multiple sources. If only one source 
is used for a comment, it will be cited. 
 
A. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION DEFINED 
Horizontal Integration can be defined as integrating multiple warfare systems 
within and across ship platforms to achieve maximum warfighting capability through 
enterprise program management, performance measures, and processes related to 
acquisition/contracts/financial, requirements allocation, systems development and 
integration, test, and certification.17  
PEO IWS was founded to oversee design, construction, and maintenance of all 
surface ship and submarine combat systems. The stated intent of this re-organization was 
to shift from a platform-centered approach to a more integrated consistent approach 
across all combat systems. PEO IWS is the entity charged with coordinating the 
integration of warfare systems into a single, functioning system of systems that can then 
be integrated onto any platform. Integration of the warfare system and the ship itself 
requires harmonization and communication between and across PEO IWS and its 
stakeholders.18 PEO IWS’s mission is, “to provide the Fleet with technically superior 
warfighting capability to take the fight to the enemy and win.”19 One way to visualize the 
difference between looking at integration in a horizontal across-the-enterprise perspective 
verses a vertical or across-the-platform perspective is depicted in Figure 1. The columns 
represent a platform centered approach, or vertically integrated, and the rows represent 
the horizontally integrated approach to warfare system acquisition. An example of an 
                                                 
17 PEO IWS Strategic Initiatives Horizontal Integration Team Decision Brief, June 17, 2005. 
18 PEO IWS 1.0 Manager Interview, May 22, 2005. 
19 PEO IWS Objectives for FY06/07 May 2006.   
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enterprise warfare system solution that is horizontally integrated is the Close In Weapons 
System (CIWS). CIWS’ is a gun system whose primary mission is terminal defense 
against anti-ship cruise missiles and high speed aircraft penetrating outer fleer defense 
envelopes.20 It was developed to be compatible with a variety of platforms. This figure 
does not represent every intricacy of the complications of fielding a warfare system; 
however, it does show how horizontal and vertical integration are related in the context of 
this research.  
  Destroyer   Amphib   Carrier 
Radar           
          
Gun System           
          
Command and Control           
Figure 1.   Horizontal Vs. Vertical Integration In PEO IWS 
 
In the past, it can be argued that the PEOs were organized in a vertical way.  Due 
to the increasing costs related to a variety of systems performing similar functions, the 
PEOs were re-arranged so that the focus would be on commonality of systems leading to 
a necked-down, or minimal, family of warfare systems leading to fewer variants of 
similarly functional systems. 
 
B. APPLICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THEORIES 
 Some PEOs were disbanded and others had their combat systems responsibilities 
re-aligned to PEO IWS to facilitate this shift.  This movement became a major 
organizational change. An analysis of the change in PEO IWS follows using Huy’s 
change interventions, Kotter’s eight stages of successful large scale change, and the 
authors of the GAO report’s transition steps. 
 
 
                                                 
20 PEO IWS Close in Weapon System (CIWS) Staffer brief February 13, 2006. 
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 1. Huy’s Change Interventions  
The commanding approach is most similar to the way in which PEO IWS went 
about its change. In PEO IWS, the change agents applied directive and forceful action to 
their change targets to exact compliance with their proposed change goals. As explained 
below, the leadership has done little of the engineering intervention, and even less of the 
teaching and socializing interventions. As the change process matures, these interventions 
may be used to help the change progress. 
a. Commanding Intervention 
As a military organization with Navy personnel as well as career civil 
servants, the commanding intervention could be argued as a logical first approach to the 
change process. A power-coercive style was used to ensure compliance with the changes 
with the expectation that the sense of urgency for the organizational changes would be 
easily understood and embraced. The change in the organization was rapidly paced which 
attempted to prevent resistance.21 The downside of using this intervention on its own is 
that long-term changes are unlikely in the organizations beliefs and values. 
The initial change effort (ASN RD&A’s re-organization message) was a 
total organization-wide commanding intervention. Huy’s theory of planned change 
stresses the importance of effective implementation of combining and sequencing 
different intervention models. Had the IWS leadership complemented the commanding 
intervention with another intervention, the organizational change may have been more 
widely understood and accepted within the new organization. But, as Huy predicts, using 
just the commanding mode was not effective in implementing the organization’s change 
initiative.  
It is evident that even though you can mandate a change from very senior 
levels and expect in a military and DoD workforce for everyone to quickly fall in line, the 
fact is that cultural resistance and in many cases the desire to return to the “good ole 
days,” make significant organizational changes take time – possibly more time than the  
 
                                                 
21 ASN RD&A Naval Message Date Time Group 112123Z OCT 02. 
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leadership expects. According to the data colleted, the senior leadership understood the 
compelling need for change; however, the workforce did not see this same urgency for 
change. 
A compounding factor in getting change to last, especially in militarily 
lead organizations, is the rate of turnover in key leadership positions and the fact many 
newcomers may not have the same commitment or understanding of why the change was 
needed in the first place. Most of the senior leadership in PEO IWS are naval officers and 
therefore rotate positions every two to three years. The newcomers usually want to get on 
with the change and quickly tire of hearing about the way things used to get done. 
Changing culture requires the persistence to make the change become the new culture of 
the workforce. In some cases, the personnel turnover can be helpful, as new people come 
in who were not part of the old culture. However, the sense of urgency and commitment 
to change must continue from the senior leadership. 
b. Engineering Intervention 
PEO IWS leadership could have applied the engineering intervention in 
the earlier stages of the change process. Had they explored the effects of the change on 
processes and procedures, they would have discovered the widespread void in 
documented working relationships.22 Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) and 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) could have been signed that would outline the 
working relationships between PEO IWS and its stakeholders.  These agreements now 
exist; however, some were agreed to as recently as March of 2005. The working out of 
the details of the agreements took time to ensure that all areas were thoroughly covered.  
Had the documents been identified earlier, working relationships would have been much 
more efficient and effective.23 
c. Teaching Intervention 
Combining the commanding intervention with the teaching intervention 
might apply to the change effort at PEO IWS. To try to apply Hue’s teaching 
intervention, the change leaders could have outlined or trained the workforce in the new 
                                                 
22  Author as Participant Observer. 
23  Author as Participant Observer. 
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way of thinking by explaining the shift from systems thinking across platforms verses the 
platform as an integrated system.  
d. Socializing Intervention 
It is possible that the PEO IWS leadership could have combined the 
commanding intervention with the socializing intervention to achieve greater long- term 
success. The socializing intervention stresses the importance of “buy-in” and describes 
how it is a necessity for change. By establishing “buy-in” from multiple levels of the 
organization, synergy among various groups could have been developed. Based on the 
concept that leaders behave and others model their behavior. When the leaders act in the 
way that the change is designed to achieve, others will follow their lead. In time, the 
grounds for the change are understood by those observing the leader. The socializing 
intervention is likely to be effective at changing social relationships which favors the 
long-term. Since the commanding intervention does not deal with the social aspect, 
combining it with the social intervention could balance the change initiative and set it up 
for long-term and short-term results. You can mandate change, but it still takes time to 
make it part of the culture for it to be internalized by the members of the organization.  
2. Kotter’s Eight Stages  
There was a sense of urgency to change the overall strategy of how defense 
systems were being acquired above the PEO level. The DoD was under pressure from 
Congress to control the costs of defense systems. ASN RD&A saw that the former PEO 
structure was creating “stove pipes”24 in programs throughout the acquisition community 
and saw this change as an opportunity to remove them.  
a. Establish a Sense of Urgency 
Kotter stresses that establishing a sense of urgency is crucial to gaining 
needed cooperation. He argues that the most successful change occurs when the sense of 
urgency comes from external factors and is recognizable to the workforce.  The PEO 
changes directed by ASN RD&A, although arguably the right thing for the Navy 
Enterprise did not carry, based on the data collected, the compelling degree of urgency 
                                                 
24 The term “stove pipe” can be defined as parts of an organization not integrating important 
specialties with other parts of the same organization.  
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that resonated to a workforce both internal and external to PEO IWS. Moreover, the 
compelling need for change was not fully embraced or accepted by all partners and 
stakeholders.25 Some stakeholders lost part of their organization when PEO IWS was 
established.  
One of the underlying motivations for the re-alignment of the PEO’s and 
NAVSEA was to optimize spending on manpower. There were external pressures to 
realize the effects of and personnel efficiencies resulting from the change before they 
came to fruition. Re-shuffling the organization was projected to yield a 20-25 percent 
savings in manpower as well as a significant savings in other funding. The structure of 
the new PEOs resulted in some roles in each program office becoming redundant. The 
leadership in PEO IWS argued that the efficiencies gained from the re-organization 
would yield more than the predicted 25 percent personnel cut and determined that a 50 
percent decrease in personnel was an achievable goal.  
The transition to the organization envisioned in Secretary Young’s 
message implied major change. Implementation of the envisioned change required 
management from people with the proper skills. Some skilled individuals were re-aligned 
prior to the change causing turmoil within PEO IWS.26 While the organization was 
changing, there was a need for employees to help in the transition, and they were not 
there – meaning the leadership cut the staff before the new processes were designed and 
fully understood by the workforce.27 The new organization needed people to make the 
necessary changes. When the personnel efficiencies were realized, there simply were less 
people around to conduct the same amount of work and implement changes. Establishing 
processes and procedures and other organizational change items fell through the cracks as 
some individuals were reverting to the “old way” of doing things.  
According to a PEO IWS Manager, the urgency for change was lost in the 
distraction caused by the parallel initiative of executing the personnel efficiencies and 
                                                 
25 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
26 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
27 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
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cuts that were taken in anticipation of a more effective PEO IWS. The personnel cuts 
(military personnel, civilian personnel, and professional support staff) were a key issue 
that stifled the sense of urgency for change. The feeling that it was better before and the 
fact that a majority of the personnel did not perceive the need to change, created a strong 
cultural resistance towards the need for organizational change.28 Many key personnel 
found jobs in other organizations. People were reluctant to seek employment in PEO IWS 
because of the change and sense of uncertainty.29 The effects of not being able to create a 
sense of urgency for change affected the whole change process. Since the first step was 
not fully accomplished, it affected the rest of the steps. 
b.  Create the Guiding Coalition 
Kotter emphasizes the importance of creating a guiding coalition. PEO 
IWS’s change team was not officially established as outlined by Kotter. One can argue 
the PEO IWS’s guiding change team was its top leadership. Kotter states that a good 
team is comprised of an equal balance of leaders and managers, which represents 
different levels of the organization. These members should have certain characteristics: 
position power, expertise, credibility, and leadership. One view is that Kotter’s idea of a 
guiding coalition was not required for this transition. However, senior leadership 
understood the change that was required but did not incorporate focused change-
management leadership into the daily operations of the workforce. For a more successful 
change, it is possible that a more representative group of members from all areas could 
have been chosen. 
c. Develop a Vision and Strategy 
PEO IWS’s vision was established through the re-organization message 
and was transitioned into the “PEO IWS Charter:” 
PEO IWS was established in November 2002 and is responsible for all 
surface ships and submarine combat systems, missiles (except Trident and 
Tomahawk), radars, launchers (except Trident), Electronic Warfare and 
gun systems. PEO IWS will combine the combat systems software 
programs for all ships and submarines and is responsible for coordinating 
all Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) area projects across PEOs including 
                                                 
28 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
29 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
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ASW software development and the annual Submarine Combat Systems 
Software Update.  Finally, PEO IWS oversees the building and buying of 
Integrated Warfare Systems for Navy platforms.30 
This charter describes the role that PEO IWS plays in the Navy acquisitions world. From 
the author’s perspective, it does not inspire change. This lack inhibits the development of 
a clear strategy. It is also not communicable or flexible – two important characteristics of 
an effective vision according to Kotter.  
d. Communicate the Change Vision 
In one manager’s view, due to the weak vision and strategy for change and 
the lack of a critical sense of urgency, the change vision was not communicated to the 
Major Program Offices in a forceful manner.31 He stated there seemed to be more of a 
collective understanding that this organizational change was a fact of life and that there 
was not much that could be done about it. Consequently, PEO IWS’s stakeholders and 
partners wanted more understanding and justification for the organizational change from 
platform focused to system focused acquisition. 
e. Empower Broad-Based Action & Break Down Barriers 
The majority of the major programs that were part of the re-organization 
of PEO IWS were physically located in the Washington Navy Yard. The only one that 
was not was IWS 3.0 – Surface Ship Weapons and Launchers. This program office was 
located in Crystal City, which was about five miles from the Navy Yard. This separation 
was recognized by the leadership in PEO IWS as a significant interference to the desired 
cohesiveness and alignment of the PEO. Several attempts failed to move this directorate 
from Crystal City to the Navy Yard. The main reason the request was denied was because 
foreign nationals were an integral part of the program office that supported, developed, 
and managed some of the weapon systems in PEO IWS 3.0. Naval Sea Systems 
Command (the senior command in the Navy Yard) cited that security concerns were too 
great to allow foreign nationals to work in the Navy Yard.  
                                                 
30 PEO IWS Objectives for FY06/07 brief, May 26, 2006. 
31 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
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Throughout the transition process, MOAs and MOUs were created, which 
established formal working relationships, agreements, and understandings between the 
PEOs and systems commands. One of the MOUs involved PEO IWS and PEO Ships. 
This document became the only written agreement of this type between these PEOs for 
nearly two years. By design, this document became a reference for the rest of the working 
relationships in PEO IWS and PEO Ships. Currently, there are additional MOAs and 
MOUs that address working relationship between IWS and other entities. However, the 
change process would have flowed smoother had these documents been scrutinized much 
earlier in the change process. 
f. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture 
Throughout the transition, PEO IWS’s organizational chart changed. 
There were multiple renditions that showed, on paper, how the organization functioned.  
This was an attempt to give a visual account of the functional lines of communication of 
the organization and eliminate some of the potential obstacles of the change process. 
Even though this was an attempt to outline the functional relationships within PEO IWS, 
it did not outline the flow of interactions between each entity within PEO IWS.  
Major change takes time. The change felt within PEO IWS was significant 
and very unsettling for IWS personnel. Kotter argues to keep the momentum of the 
change, progress needs to be shown so that the non-believers and those who have not 
bought-in to the change see that there is merit in doing things the new way. PEO IWS 
showed its progress toward the new way of doing business by recognizing the 
achievements of some of the program offices within PEO IWS. The Program Executive 
Officer held “all hands calls” and presented the organization with “PEO IWS 
Accomplishments” many times. He informed everyone of the status of the change and 
created a PEO IWS Excellence Award. By presenting the entire command with a list of 
accomplishments, he showed the non-believers that, not only was the organization 
changing, but it was excelling during the changes.  
3. GAO STUDY on Mergers and Transition Steps 
The GAO study defined nine key practices that are central to successful mergers, 
acquisitions, and transformations in the public and private sector.  Unlike Kotter’s stages 
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and Huy’s change initiatives, these steps occur at the very beginning of the change 
transition. The data gathered showed that PEO IWS followed the intent of some of these 
practices. 
a.  Ensure Top Leadership Drives the Transformation  
The first step in the GAO study is relatively easy to follow in a military 
organization. In the case of PEO IWS, there was no doubt about top leadership driving 
the transformation. They showed commitment to change and to deliver early successes. 
The rationale for transformation was presented to employees, customers, and 
stakeholders. However, the sense of what the organization intended to accomplish was 
not clear to the people who were actually implementing the change.32 
b. Establish a Coherent Mission and Integrated Strategic Goals 
The mission and strategic goals for the transition were understood by the 
leadership; however, they were not clearly articulated to the employees. An example is 
the personnel re-alignments and reductions. This caused a large amount of uncertainty in 
the organization’s goals and direction. Not knowing the goals of the changed 
organization combined with the stress of downsizing sent mixed signals. 
c. Set Implementation Goals and a Timeline 
The GAO report also discusses the importance of setting timelines for 
change goals to be achieved and establishing a communication strategy to create shared 
expectations. These steps were not achieved.33 Had the change leadership established 
change goals and timelines to follow, then the change could have been easier to track and 
manage. 
d. Dedicate an Implementation Team 
The implementation team, as discussed earlier, was made up of the top 
leadership and was not made up of a “cadre of champions” like the GAO report authors 
suggest. A change team comprised of different members might have better facilitated the 
change process. 
 
                                                 
32 Author as Participant Observer. 
33 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
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e. Involve Employees to Obtain Their Ideas and Gain Their 
Ownership for the Transformation 
The study recommends involving employees’ ideas and inputs into the 
change. This creates an opportunity for a sense of ownership of the organizations goals 
and objectives. The data indicate that there was little employee involvement in the change 
process. Nearly one year after the change was initiated, there were groups of employees 
in PEO IWS that did not see the need for change and consequently were un-accepting or 
resistant to change. In the GAO report, such groups are an example of limited employee 
involvement. The data indicate that groups existed who had no intention to change and 
intended to “wait out” the transformation.34 Attempts were made by the leadership to 
inform these personnel that the necessary organizational change was going forward with, 
or without them, and they were encouraged to “get on the bus.”   
f. Build a World Class Organization 
The leadership of PEO IWS did attempt to use “best practices” as the 
GAO study recommends. An “offsite” meeting was scheduled that was attended by the 
leaders of each of the major programs in PEO IWS. Key stakeholders and a change 
consultant were invited to discuss their working relations and interactions with PEO IWS. 
The stakeholders were encouraged to speak candidly and give genuine feedback about 
their likes and dislikes with PEO IWS. The offsite meetings sent a powerful message to 
the organization about the seriousness of the effort to successfully implement the required 
transition. One outcome of this offsite was the establishment of the Horizontal Integration 
Board (HIB). This is a PEO IWS effort to look into the issues that contribute to the 
difficulties in Horizontal Integration.  
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The organizational change in PEO IWS to some degree followed the approaches 
of Huy, Kotter, and the authors of the GAO study. There are many processes that are 
being updated to accommodate the organizational change occurring in PEO IWS. Each 
approach lends insight into how PEO IWS could have managed the organizational change 
                                                 
34 PEO IWS Manager interview, June 6, 2006. 
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more effectively. It seems as though the change leaders used some parts of each 
approach. Had they incorporated more of the ideas from the three approaches to change, 












V. REMAINING CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMATION  
When implementing the change from platform centric (vertical) acquisition to 
systems level (horizontal) acquisition, all functions and organizational relationships 
within PEO IWS were affected to some degree. Had the leadership of PEO IWS followed 
the approaches of Huy, Kotter, or the authors of the GAO study, it is possible that the 
difficulties of horizontal integration may have been mitigated. Most importantly, 
personnel acceptance and “buy-in” that change is necessary might also been achieved.  
PEO IWS continues to face challenges with horizontal integration. The following 
items were identified through interviews with members of PEO IWS. They reflect that 
the organization is continuing to catch up with the challenges of horizontal integration.    
 
A. FLOW OF FUNDS  
Horizontal integration would be significantly improved if the money marked for 
the warfare system in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account came 
directly to PEO IWS. The control of warfare systems development, procurement, and 
integration funds currently are not managed by PEO IWS. This inhibits the development 
of overarching warfare systems and the reduction of baselines.35 Presently, SCN is 
appropriated to procure a complete ship and it is directed to the ship funding line – either 
PEO Aircraft Carriers or PEO Ships.  PEO IWS executes the Warfare System portion of 
the ship’s procurement.   
The Ship Program Manager has control of the funding, so that individual can take 
absolute control of the weapons systems placed on the ship.  The choices made regarding 
which warfare system to procure may not be the best one for the platform and may also 
run contrary to the direction of the Navy Enterprise. In contrast, Other Procurement, 
Navy (OPN), is appropriated directly to warfare systems programs in PEO IWS and that 
 
                                                 
35 Warfare Systems Acquisition Strategy brief, August 25,  2005. 
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works fairly well.36 A recommended fix to the funding issue would be for Congress to 
allocate the warfare systems portion of the SCN account to PEO IWS and not through the 
SPM.37  
Another recommendation would be to have the warfare system resources 
separately priced and managed by PEO IWS.  That means the entire warfare system 
including subsystems from SPAWAR, NAVAIR, and USMC.  “Pricing out” the warfare 
system as a single entity that has a single entry point into IWS allows the SPMs to 
manage and track the resources and the resultant tasks and deliverables for the warfare 
system.38   
The flow of funds is a persistent indicator that the change presented by standing 
up PEO IWS may not be permanent. In fact, this may be the lingering issue that continues 
to cause friction. This is an obstacle to the success of PEO IWS and could be a short-term 
change.39  
 
B. CONFLICTING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
Inconsistent approaches to warfare systems planning and execution between 
SPMs results in an unclear delineation of authority and responsibility. The data indicate 
that roles and responsibilities between PEOs are not clearly defined or documented. The 
MOAs between PEOs are inconsistent in how they address warfare system management 
and development. Some of the working relationships are acknowledged for specific 
functions between one PEO and another. However, the data indicate that they are 
personality dependant. PEO Carriers is reliant on PEO IWS for combat system selection 
and warfare system engineering and integration; nonetheless, they have retained control 
of funds. The decision process regarding what system is to be fitted on a particular 
platform is different for PEO Ships and PEO Carriers. For the LHA program, the 
 
                                                 
36 PEO IWS Manager interview, April 25, 2006. 
37 PEO IWS Manager interview, April 24, 2006. 
38 PEO IWS Manager interview, April 25, 2006. 
39 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 22, 2006. 
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Program Manager in PEO Ships retains configuration control and effectively has PEO 
IWS as the purchasing agents for him. PEO Carriers asks PEO IWS to bring them a turn-
key solution.40  
There is an MOA between PEO IWS and PEO Ships. While the MOA was 
supposed to span ship programs, it focuses mostly on DD(X). In the MOA, little is 
applicable to other SPMs (e.g., LPD 17 class, LHA 6 class); therefore, their program 
offices act as though it does not pertain to them. Although there was a reference that 
described a working relationship between the two PEOs, it is not detailed or overarching 
and has little application to any program other than DD(X). This example is evidence that 
there was intent to lay out the working relationships between the organizations; however, 
it only addressed the DD(X) program.  
Throughout the change process, there have been additional MOAs that outlined 
specific interactions between PEO IWS and other PEOs. In particular, the MOA between 
PEO Aircraft Carriers, PEO IWS, PEO C4I, and PEO Strike, is very detailed and 
describes each PEO’s role in supporting PEO Aircraft Carriers and their mission of  being 
responsible of for the design and construction of aircraft carriers and delivery of them to 
the fleet as war ready. In some cases, SPMs have been allowed to write contracts for the 
entire carrier warfare system. It is not clear how this practice supports horizontal 
integration and Navy Enterprise-wide management of warfare systems. 
Another example of conflicting roles and responsibilities is that there are staffs 
that reside in the PEOs that are not properly aligned and tasked. As a result of the 
organizational change, some of the warfare systems engineering functions remained in 
PEOs other than PEO IWS, even though PEO IWS is assigned as the Warfare Systems 
Engineer. One example is that PEO Carriers transferred its combat system engineering to 
PEO IWS while PEO Ships maintained systems engineering proficiency through support 
contractors even though the lead warfare systems engineers are assigned by PEO IWS. 
Redundancy occurs when both staffs are doing the same thing. The stated intent of 
Secretary Young’s re-organization was to get the warfare systems engineering process 
                                                 
40 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 30, 2006. 
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into one PEO, which is PEO IWS. Because some PEOs retained the systems engineering 
function, the personnel actually responsible for that part of the integration, are not 
performing the required functions. This has resulted in the systems engineering function 
occurring more than once, which can become quite costly. In order to eliminate the 
problem, both sides must trust the validity of the work done by the other.41  
 
C. OBLIGATIONAL PHASING PLANS (OPP) 
Traditionally, OPPs represent the expenditure of funds per quarter over time, such 
as a year. Usually they are broken down into months in a quarter over multiple years.  
The prerequisite is a budget or a cost estimate in support of a budget.  According to 
interviews with PEO IWS Managers, OPPs should show, over a period of time, when the 
funds are planned to be expended.  Because more and more ship programs are getting 
incrementally funded, Ship Program Managers are asking for the additional granularity in 
time phasing the distribution of funds according to gathered data.  For the most part, the 
issue over OPPs is one of standardization. The fundamental issue is there is not one form 
dubbed the “OPP” that participating managers are using.  Each product area manager 
(PARM) is creating his or her own forms based on their perceived need.  The lack of 
uniformity of forms across the command can lead to subtle misinterpretations on what is 
being said.   A single form with the same or similar structure along with term usage 
would be a useful solution.   In some cases PARMs are using the Cost Estimate Form 
NAVSEA FORM 7300.4, which is not intended to be used in this way. In these situations 
the 7300 form is being used for both the estimate and the phasing plan.  Time phasing 
funds expenditures fall into the world of “execution” while cost estimating is a planning 
function.  Form 7300.4 is intended for cost estimations only.42  
An example of this problem is that sometimes the OPP does not match the cost 
estimate.  Therefore, there are two sets of numbers being used leaving the recipient in the 
                                                 
41 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 30, 2006. 
42 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 3, 2006. 
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position of asking which numbers or set of numbers is correct.  To solve these issues 
sometimes an adjudication meeting is necessary to align the two number sets.43  
 
D. ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS (ECP) 
The burden for doing change control, coordination management, and platform 
warfare system engineering relies on the SPMs and the ShipMain process instead of PEO 
IWS.44 Non-Aegis system engineering and change control was lost at the directorate level 
during the stand up of PEO IWS. Proper resourcing is needed to ensure success. Many 
proposed changes that were reaching the Ship Program Managers were uncoordinated 
and would cause other warfare system elements to not work. 45  
An example of uncoordinated ECPs can be seen when coordinating changes to the 
Warfare System Interface Diagrams (WSID). They depict all warfare system elements 
and their interconnectivities for each ship and are used to maintain ship warfare system 
configurations. In the past, requested WSID changes to aircraft carriers, amphibious, 
auxiliary, Coast Guard, and land-based test sites (LBTS) have often bypassed the PEO 
IWS Warfare System Engineers responsible for system engineering coordination for 
these platforms.  These uncoordinated changes, when implemented aboard ships, have 
resulted in warfare systems having impaired operability. Fixing these unexpected 
integration problems consumes resources that are often unbudgeted.46  
 
E. PARM REVIEWS  
The PARM is the office responsible for offering a warfare system element to be 
installed into a platform; a radar or gun, for example. A PARM Review is a forum at 
which the Ship Program Managers acquires programmatic information on PARM 
procured Government Furnished Material (GFM) (Equipment and Information).  The 
reviews, the forums themselves, are not uniformed and tend to be oriented to a specific 
                                                 
43 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 22, 2006. 
44 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 22, 2006. 
45 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 22, 2006. 
46 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 30, 2006. 
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ship type or ship class.   For example, PMS 317 will host PARM Reviews for LPD 17 
Class ships and exclude the likes of Carriers and other ship types.   PMS 377 will do the 
same limiting the forum to their particular ship types.   PEO Aircraft Carriers has similar 
forums and calls them Critical Program Reviews.  Therefore, there are different names 
for the same forum.   A recommendation would be to have one forum for a specific 
warfare system (example: radars), and address all ship types.   Currently, PARMs are 
going to multiple reviews and presenting relatively the same redundant programmatic 
information on GFM being procured. 
The inefficiencies get worse when the reporting formats vary depending on the 
ship’s program office.  Each SPM is using their own report template, thus asking for the 
same information but in a different way. Multiple meetings and multiple templates waste 
























                                                 
47 PEO IWS Manager interview, May 22, 2006. 
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APPENDIX A: PEO IWS STAKEHOLDERS 
There are multiple entities that PEO IWS influences. In turn, PEO IWS gets 
tasking from multiple bodies. 
A. Congress 
1.  Appropriators 
The House Appropriations Committee for Defense (HAC-D) and the Senate 
Appropriations Committee for Defense (SAC-D) are responsible for reviewing, 
approving and appropriating funding for all programs in PEO IWS.  
2. Authorizers 
The United States House Committee on Armed Services (HASC) and United 
States Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC) are responsible for reviewing, 
approving and authorizing all programs in PEO IWS. The HASC and SASC are 
responsible for funding and oversight of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
United States armed forces, as well as substantial portions of the Department of Energy.48 
The SASC is empowered with legislative oversight of the nation's military, including the 
Department of Defense, military research and development, nuclear energy (as pertaining 
to national security), benefits for members of the military, the Selective Service System 
and other matters related to defense policy.49  
Both the authorizers and the appropriators review each program prior to each 
budget year. If they decide the program is performing as expected, funding levels are 
recommended for inclusion into the Department of Defense budget. Sometimes, language 
is written into the bill requiring the program manager to make specific decisions.  
 
B. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition 
(ASN RDA) 
ASN RDA is the reporting senior for PEO IWS. Much of the direction and 
guidance for the short-term and long-term activities within IWS originates with ASN 
                                                 
48 HASC Website: http://www.house.gov/hasc/. Accessed March 26 2006. 
49 SASC Website: http://armed-services.senate.gov/ Accessed March 26, 2006. 
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RDA. PEO IWS reports directly to Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition (ASN RDA) regarding acquisition management and to the 
Chief of Naval Operations through the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) regarding support for in-service vessels.50 
 
3. The Office of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N86 
The Office of Naval Operations, N86, is responsible for setting the warfare and 
performance requirements for naval surface warfare assets. It is the job of the acquisition 
community to research, develop, procure, and sustain those assets. Therefore, PEO IWS 
performs its mission based on the requirements set forth by OPNAV N86. 
N76, the Surface Warfare Directorate, is responsible for naval surface ship 
investment, current readiness, and modernization as well as future ship acquisition. The 
goal is to provide the President of the United States a surface navy that has the capability 
to defeat all maritime threats to the country and defend our way of life.51 
 
4. Other Program Executive Offices 
Without other PEOs, PEO IWS would not be able to field the majority of its 
programs. PEO IWS primarily deals with PEO SHIPS and PEO AIRCRAFT 
CARRIERS. 
A. Program Executive Office for Ships 
PEO SHIPS mission statement is as follows: “PEO SHIPS acquires and supports 
the current and future surface fleet, translating warfighter requirements into combat 
capability, producing and supporting ships, boats and craft from cradle to grave, enabling 
our nation and its allies to project presence in peace, power in war and assured access 
anytime. PEO Ships is a focused Navy team, providing the world’s best ship innovation, 
acquisition, lifecycle support and disposal leadership.” 
                                                 
50 PEO SHIPS Website. Accessed March 26, 2006. http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/FAQ.htm. 




B. Program Executive Office for Aircraft Carriers 
PEO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS is responsible for the acquisition, life cycle 
management, and development of aircraft carriers and air platforms of the future, as well 
as modernizing and upgrading the present carrier fleet. They produce an integrated, fully 























































APPENDIX B: ACQUISITION PARTICIPANTS & DEFINITIONS 
A. PARM 
The Participating Managers (PARM) must coordinate each system modernization 
effort very closely with Ship Platform Managers (SPM), other PARMs, contractors, In-
Service Engineering Agents (ISEAs), planning yards, equipment manufacturers and 
laboratories in order to assure effective ship integration and system interoperability (PEO 
IWS Manager, personal communications, May 26th, 2006). The PARM is the office 
responsible for offering a warfare system element to be installed into a platform; a radar 
or gun, for example. PARMs are responsible for acquiring and developing systems to 
modernize Naval vessels. PARMs are responsible for acquiring and developing systems 
to modernize naval vessels. As such, PARMs must coordinate each system modernization 
effort very closely with Ship Platform Managers (SPM), other PARMs, contractors, In-
Service Engineering Agents (ISEAs), planning yards, equipment manufacturers, and 
laboratories in order to assure effective ship integration and system interoperability PEO 
IWS Manager, personal communications, May 26th, 2006). 
 
B. SHAPM 
The Ship Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM) is responsible for all aspects 
of life cycle modernization and support for a naval vessel at the platform level. A PARM 
shares the same responsibility for individual subsystems within these platforms. 
 
C. SPM 
The Ship Program Manager (SPM) is the office in PEO SHIPS (or PEO Carriers, 







Finally, there are the Warfare Systems Engineers (WSE). They are responsible for 
ensuring a variety of PARMs are engineering, producing and delivering their warfare 
system elements within cost, on schedule and to specific performance levels to ensure all 
the elements come together as a single, integrated warfare system to be installed onto the 
WSE’s respective platform of responsibility. The WSE’s are split into platforms of 
responsibility – WSE for CVN’s, WSE for DDG and CG, WSE for DD(X), WSE for 
Amphibious ships, Auxiliary Ships and Coast Guard Cutters. Each WSE must coordinate 
with the PARMs and the SPMs to field a complete ship.  
 
E. The Warfare Systems Engineering Processes 
The first step in putting a warfare system onto a ship is the SPM reviews the 
requirements for the specific ship being constructed or overhauled. The SPM then 
decides what warfare system will best meet the requirements and contacts the WSE for 
that specific platform (or bypasses the WSE and deals directly with the individual 
PARMs). The WSE then contacts the applicable PARMs that will be providing elements 
of that specific warfare system and cost estimates for the warfare system elements (not 
integration or installation) are prepared. An individual funding estimate (NAVSEA form 
7300) is produced for each warfare system element. The SPM then collects that 
information and, builds the price for the entire warfare system development, production 
and delivery process, and negotiates with the planning yard/prime contractor the costs for 
integrating the warfare system elements into the ship and also for physical installation.      
 
F. Warfare System 
Warfare System as defined in the NWSCP (NAVSEAINST 9410.2) “includes the 
Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems, Combat Support Systems and 
training systems, subject to the C5IMP baselining process …that meet the definition for 
category I and category II systems… and are deployed in Navy surface, subsurface and 
air platforms.” 
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APPENDIX C: ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS 
Figure 2.   PEO IWS Organizational Chart 
 
 48






APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTION AND DECISION AUTHORITY 
FOR ACAT I – III PROGRAMS 
Figure 4.   Description and Decision Authority for ACAT I – III Programs 
Acquisition 
Category  
Reason for ACAT Designation  Decision Authority  
ACAT I  MDAP (10 USC 2430, reference (n)))  
Dollar value: estimated by the USD(AT&L) to 
require an eventual total expenditure for 
research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal 
year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for 
procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in FY 
2000 constant dollars  
MDA designation  
MDA designation as special interest  
ACAT ID: 
USD(AT&L)  
ACAT IC: Head of the 
DoD Component or, if 
delegated, the DoD 
Component Acquisition 
Executive (CAE)  
ACAT IA  MAIS: Dollar value of AIS estimated by the DoD 
Component Head to require program costs (all 
appropriations) in any single year in excess of $32 
million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars, total 
program costs in excess of $126 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars, or total life-cycle costs in excess of 
$378 million in FY 2000 constant dollars  
MDA designation as special interest  
ACAT IAM: 
ASD(C3I)/DoD CIO  
ACAT IAC: CAE, as 
delegated by the DoD 
CIO  
ACAT II  Does not meet criteria for ACAT I  
Major system  
Dollar value: estimated by the DoD Component 
Head to require an eventual total expenditure 
for RDT&E of more than $140 million in FY 
2000 constant dollars, or for procurement of 
more than $660 million in FY 2000 constant 
dollars (10 USC 2302d, reference (o))  
MDA designation 4 (10 USC 2302(5), reference 
(p))  
MDA designation as special interest  
DoD CAE or the 
individual designated 
by the CAE  
ACAT III  Does not meet criteria for ACAT II or above  
Less-than a MAIS program  
Designated by the DoD 




• In some cases, an ACAT IA program, as defined above, also meets the definition of an MDAP. 
The USD(AT&L) and the ASD( C3I )/DoD CIO shall decide who will be the MDA for such 
programs. Regardless of who is the MDA, the statutory requirements that apply to MDAPs shall 
apply to such programs.  
• An AIS program is an acquisition program that acquires IT, except IT that involves equipment 
that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system, or is an acquisition of services program. 
• The ASD( C3I )/DoD CIO shall designate programs as ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC. MAIS programs 
shall not be designated as ACAT II.  
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